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Information Asymmetry about Investment Risk and Financing Choice 
 
ABSTRACT 
Though it is generally accepted that information asymmetry has an impact on capital structure 
policy, the nature of the information asymmetry is not well understood. Recent theoretical work 
and empirical evidence suggests that security choice depends upon the information asymmetry 
associated with the investment risk of the particular use of proceeds. Consistent with this view, 
using the sources and uses of funds framework, we find that equity is used to fund projects with 
greater information asymmetry about their risk such as research and development expenditure, 
while debt is used to fund investments with lower information asymmetry about their risk such as 
liquidity enhancement.  
JEL Classification: G310 and G320 
Key Words:  Firm Investment, Capital Structure, Information Asymmetry 
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I. Introduction 
The role of information asymmetry in corporate financing has become one of the basic tenets 
of capital structure theory. The most enduring version is the popularly known pecking order (PO) 
hypothesis posited by Myers and Majluf (1984). The model predicts that information asymmetry 
between managers and investors leads to adverse selection costs, creating a hierarchy of financing 
preference based on the information sensitivity of the security. In this scheme, retained earnings 
are the least information sensitive, followed by debt, and then external equity. Thus, firms are 
inclined to fund their financing deficit first by retained earnings, then by debt issuance, and only 
as a last resort by external equity issuance. The intensity of research in this area is only matched 
by the lack of empirical consensus for the PO theory.1  For example, the PO theory cannot explain 
why young, small, and non-dividend paying firms that face large asymmetric information 
problems, issue equity securities (e.g., Ambarish et al., 1987; Fama and French, 2002; and Wu and 
Wang 2005). Survey findings of Graham and Harvey (2001) also suggest that small and non-
dividend paying firms’ financing decisions are not consistent with PO theory. 
Though evidence in favor of PO is mixed, Leary and Roberts (2010) suggest that measures of 
information asymmetry may be systematically related to financing behavior, albeit not necessarily 
in sync with the predictions of the PO model. Specifically, some of the observed patterns with 
respect to small firms, age, and asset tangibility suggest that information asymmetry relating to 
future investments may play an important role. Recent theoretical work by Halov and Heider 
                                                          
1 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (SM) (1999) find some support for the PO theory while Frank and Goyal (2003),  Fama 
and French (2002, 2005),Wu and Wang (2005),  and Leary and Roberts (2010) find significant evidence against it.    
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(2012,), Halov, Heider and John (2011),   and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001), and Wu and Wang 
(2005) provide support for such a view. These models predict a preference for equity over debt 
when there is greater information asymmetry between the firm and outsiders about future 
investment risk (i.e., project risk to which the funds are directed).  WW also show that 
announcement returns associated with issuance of equity are more likely to be positive when the 
asymmetric information about firm value arises mainly from growth (future investment) rather 
than assets-in-place.  
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence to support the notion that the information 
asymmetry of the underlying project risk (e.g., relative success of a new product such as a new 
drug or the growth potential from a plant expansion) is what drives financing choice. For testing 
purposes, we classify investments into a hierarchy based on their underlying risk information 
asymmetry: liquidity investments (lowest risk), capital expenditures (moderate risk), and R&D 
investments (highest risk). We argue that liquidity-enhancing investments (e.g., building up cash) 
are associated with fairly low information asymmetry about their risk while, at the other extreme, 
investments in R&D are expected to be associated with the greatest information asymmetry about 
their project risk. On the other hand, as capital expenditures tend to be focused on investments in 
fixed assets, they are assumed to hold an intermediate position between liquidity-enhancing 
investments and intangible investments (i.e., R&D expenditures). Thus, we expect debt financing 
to be associated with subsequent low risk information asymmetry liquidity-enhancing investments 
while equity financing should be more closely related with high underlying risk information 
asymmetry investments such as R&D.  
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For our empirical methodology we employ the sources and uses of funds framework used in 
several studies (e.g., Chang, Dasgupta, Wong, and Yao, 2014; Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan, 
2010) based on the accounting identity that the total funds used by the firm should equal internal 
cash flows in addition to debt and equity raised by the firm. The primary uses of funds we consider 
are research and development expenditure (R&D), capital expenditure, working capital changes, 
changes in cash holdings and cash dividends.2 We find that per dollar of equity issued 22 cents is 
used for R&D, while only 1 cent per dollar of debt goes toward R&D financing. With respect to 
capital expenditures, 11 cents of every dollar of debt financing is devoted to this expenditure in 
contrast to only 5 cents in the case of equity financing.  A similar pattern is evident for working 
capital expenditures where 9 cents of every dollar of debt financing ends up but only 3 cents in the 
case of equity.  In the case of cash, we find that 77 cents of every dollar of debt goes towards 
building up cash while the equivalent for equity is 68 cents. Thus, we can conclude that 
investments with high information asymmetry about their risk (e.g., R&D) are funded primarily 
by equity and not debt, while investments with low information asymmetry about their risk exhibit 
an affinity for debt financing.   
Our investigation builds on the prior works of Kim and Weisbach (2008), DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010), Halov and Heider (2012), and Gatchev, Spindt, and Tarhan (2009).  
Kim and Weisbach (2008) and DeAngelo et al. (2010) link equity issuance proceeds to how they 
are subsequently utilized.  However, their choice of methodology and the focus on equity issuances 
                                                          
2 Though our focus is on investment related uses of funds, we include dividends to meet the cash flow identity 
requirement. 
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exclusively makes it difficult to draw any causal inferences between sources of financing and the 
particular use of funds. Specifically, it is difficult to infer that an equity issuance in the current 
period is used for a particular investment in the following period, if other sources of financing are 
not controlled for in the current and subsequent period. That is, it is possible that next period’s 
capital expenditure may be more closely associated with next period’s debt financing and not 
necessarily with this period’s equity issuance.  Additionally, these studies are not focused 
specifically on linking sources of financing to investments differentiated on the basis of their risk 
information asymmetry.  Rather, the studies are more broadly focused on how equity issuances are 
deployed.  Further, in the case of DeAngelo et al. (2010) they don’t consider R&D as a possible 
use of funds.  
Similar to our study, Gatchev et al. (2009) use the accounting identity framework to relate 
financing decisions to changes in investments.  Among other things, they find R&D and 
advertising expenses (classified together) and net working capital investments are primarily 
financed by equity while fixed asset investments, e.g., capital expenditures, are largely financed 
by debt.  Gatchev et al. (2009)  do not separate R&D from advertising expenses arguing that as 
both are intangible in nature their information asymmetry will be high. Though intangible in 
nature, our view is that advertising expenses are primarily about promoting current products and 
services and protecting current market share (e.g., Coke), as such they should be closely associated 
with the firm’s current and past investment in tangible assets. Consequently, the information 
asymmetry surrounding advertising expenditures should be much less than that associated with 
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R&D.  By combining both expenditures together, we are unable to determine to what extent 
Gatchev et al.’s (2009) findings are driven by R&D and by advertising expenses.   
Additionally, in our study we conduct robustness tests to ensure that the R&D results are due 
to information asymmetry about investment risk rather than to the inherently greater risk associated 
with R&D investments. Our study also adds to the evidence in Halov and Heider (2012) for their 
theoretical model that information asymmetry about project risk drives security preference.  They 
use recent firm asset volatility as a proxy for project risk asymmetry and find that greater asset 
volatility is associated with preference for  equity issuance.  By linking the capital raised to where 
it is deployed, we are able to provide additional evidence in support of Halov and Heider’s (2012) 
theoretical argument and empirical evidence.   
Overall, our contributions may be summarized as follows: (1) We provide empirical support 
for recent theoretical work that links financing choice to information asymmetry about the risk of 
future investments. Consistent with Halov and Heider (2012), Gatchev et al. (2009), and Wu and 
Wang (2005) we provide evidence that equity is predominantly used to finance R&D projects 
where information asymmetry about investment risk and debt contracting costs (agency cost of 
debt) are likely to be high. In contrast, debt is predominantly used to finance capital expenditures 
and liquidity needs where risk information asymmetry and debt contracting costs (agency cost of 
debt) are likely to be low. (2) We provide this empirical support in a comprehensive framework 
that considers both debt and equity financing and on the investment side differentiates investments 
by their underlying degree of risk information asymmetry. Previous studies either ignored one of 
the sources of financing or did not delineate investments by their risk information asymmetry.  (3) 
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Our methodology is based on a framework of joint determination of sources and uses of funds, 
allowing us to better establish causality between financing choice and how those funds are 
deployed, and mitigate the problem of omitted variables.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the hypotheses. In 
Section III, we discuss our empirical design and sample. Section IV presents the results, and 
Section V concludes.  
 
II.  Hypotheses Development 
Recent work by Halov and Heider (2012) and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) suggests that the 
nature of the investment may dictate financing preference. Halov and Heider (2012) argue that the 
traditional PO model ignores investment risk. Specifically, the traditional Myers and Majluf (1984) 
PO model assumes that the adverse selection costs vary across securities but that investment risk 
is constant. Halov and Heider (2012, p. 2) argue that “debt dominates equity financing only if there 
is no asymmetric information about the risk of firm’s future investments.” More importantly, they 
demonstrate that at the other extreme equity dominates debt financing when “there is only 
asymmetric information about the risk of the firms’ future investments.” (Halov and Heider, 2012, 
p. 2). Their model shows that firms prefer equity over debt when there is greater information 
asymmetry between the firm and outsiders about future investment risk, i.e., adverse selection cost 
of debt increases with information asymmetry about investment risk. They note that their theory 
is consistent with observed patterns that the debt-financing deficit relationship is weakest for small 
and young firms (e.g., Fama and French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2003), Lemmon and Zender 
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(2010)), precisely the firms that are deemed to be most affected by adverse selection costs in the 
traditional PO model. HH note that small and young firms are the ones most likely to be associated 
with greater information asymmetry about the risk of their future investments. Similarly, Fulghieri 
and Lukin, (2001, p. 5) find that “the likelihood that a firm will issue equity increases with the 
value of the project relative to the amount of external funds raised and with the extent of the 
informational asymmetry between insiders and outsiders.” Cooney and Kalay (1993) refine Myers 
and Majluf’s (1984) model and show that if the market anticipates a valuable project for the firm 
and the uncertainty surrounding the NPV of the new project is sufficiently large relative to assets-
in-place, then stock price reaction would be positive in response to an equity issue announcement.  
This in turn implies a preference for equity financing.  Cooney and Kalay (1993) suggest that high 
market-to-book value firms are likely to have greater uncertainty about the value of their 
investment opportunities than about the value of their assets-in-place, and hence are more likely 
to experience positive announcement effects.  Wu and Wang (2005) show that taking into account 
the private benefits of control may yield predictions that diverge from the original Myers-Majluf.  
Their model shows that when the asymmetric information comes from growth rather than assets-
in-place it is possible that the adverse selection cost of equity is actually reversed.  
We test the proposition that debt (equity) will be associated with investments characterized by 
lower (greater) information asymmetry regarding their risk. To test this hypothesis, we consider 
three major financing needs by investment type: R&D, capital expenditures, and liquidity. We 
focus on these needs because they are the most frequently stated reasons for issuing debt and 
equity. These discrete investment types are assumed to have varying information asymmetries with 
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regard to their risk, ranging from low to high in the following order: liquidity, capital expenditures, 
R&D. In the next few paragraphs, we discuss each of these investment types and their relevance 
to financing choice. 
A. R&D  
All corporate investments are presumed to be associated with information asymmetries 
because managers are better informed, whereas outside investors observe only aggregated and 
perhaps cryptic information about the potential of the firm’s investments.   However, we argue 
that different classes of investments are associated with varying levels of information asymmetry 
about their risk.  For example, relative to R&D investments, capital expenditures tend to be more 
tangible (fixed assets) and capitalized on the firm’s balance sheet.  R&D expenditures on the other 
hand are generally viewed as intangible investments that are associated with the creation of growth 
options. Investments in R&D are expensed with little disclosure about the potential future cash 
flow benefits (Aboody and Lev, 2000).  Additionally, R&D projects are inherently uncertain. For 
example, Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone (2002) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) document 
that R&D expenditures, in contrast to capital expenditures, are associated with greater future 
earnings volatility and stock return volatility. Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique (2004) suggest that 
while increases in firms’ R&D expenditures are beneficial investments, the market is slow to 
recognize the future potential benefit associated with investments in R&D. To the extent that R&D 
expenditure is unique and is strategic in nature, insiders have a better read on R&D project risk 
than outside investors. In such a setting, an asymmetric problem exists with regard to the project 
11 
 
risk associated with R&D investments. Overall, R&D expenditures represent investments that are 
informationally less transparent relative to capital expenditures. 
The above arguments imply that firms may prefer to issue equity to finance R&D investments 
where informational asymmetries about investment risk and the debt issuance cost (agency cost of 
debt) are likely to be high. This leads to our first testable hypothesis: 
H1: R&D investments are more closely associated with equity than debt financing. 
B.  Capital Expenditures 
While both R&D and capital expenditures are considered long-term investments that are 
needed for the growth of the firm, capital expenditures differ from investment in R&D in several 
ways (e.g., Aboody and Lev (2000)). First, while R&D is associated with the creation of growth 
options, capital expenditure is associated with the exercise of growth options.  Second, as noted 
above, R&D is an investment in intangible asset, while capital expenditure is an investment in 
tangible (fixed) asset such as property, plant, and equipment. Third, most capital expenditure 
investments share common characteristics across firms and within the industry, while R&D 
projects in general are unique to the developing firm. Fourth, there exists a secondary market for 
tangible assets which can provide information about their asset value. In contrast, R&D has no 
organized markets and hence there is less reliable information available about its value. Fifth, 
accounting measurement and reporting rules treat tangible assets differently from R&D, which is 
immediately expensed. For example, quarterly or annual financial statements report periodic 
recognition of value of impairment of tangible assets, providing investors with updated 
information about changes in asset values. Thus, the extent of information asymmetry associated 
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with investment in capital expenditures is significantly less than that associated with investments 
in R&D. In such cases, firms prefer to issue less information-sensitive securities such as debt to 
finance capital expenditures.  Thus, we hypothesize that, all else being equal, firms should prefer 
debt to finance capital expenditures:  
H2: Capital expenditure investments are more closely associated with debt than equity 
financing. 
C.  Liquidity 
We define liquidity investment as a need for cash and working capital by a firm that is 
otherwise fundamentally sound (Neamtiu et al. 2014). From the investors’ point of view, supplying 
capital to fulfill liquidity needs is associated with less information asymmetry about the risk of the 
investment. Investors can make reasonable judgments by looking at the firm’s financial statements 
and public disclosures. In this situation, debt financing would be the cheaper alternative as there 
is very little information asymmetry surrounding the nature of the investment. On the other hand, 
from the point of view of potential outside equity investors, an increase in the firm’s cash holdings 
may not add enough value considering relatively high information production costs and may thus 
be less attractive to outside equity holders to justify their risk of owning a part of the firm. Once 
again, consistent with Halov and Heider (2012) and Halov et al. (2011) models, we argue that 
firms tend to issue debt to fund liquidity needs: 
H3: Liquidity enhancing investments are more closely associated with debt than equity 
financing. 
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III.  Empirical Strategy and Sample 
The above hypotheses are evaluated using the sources and uses of funds framework 
commonly adopted in tests of the pecking order and, more broadly, in research that links 
investments to financing (e.g., Chang et al., 2014; and Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan, 2010). 
Chang et al. (2014) and Gatchev et al. (2010) adopt the view that investment and financing 
decisions are made jointly subject to the constraint that sources of cash must equal uses of cash. 
We focus on four primary uses of funds— R&D expenditure (R&D), capital expenditure 
(CAPEX), change in working capital (WORKCAP), and change in cash (∆CASH). An additional 
use of funds is the cash dividends (DIV) paid out by firms, which is not a focus of this study but 
included to meet the cash flow identity requirement. Specifically, following Chang et al. (2014) 
and Gatchev et al. (2010) our empirical strategy exploits the following cash flow identity: 
 R&D + CAPEX + WORKCAP + ∆CASH  +DIV= Cashflow + Debt + Equity                (1) 
The left hand side of the above equation identifies the various uses of funds. These include  R&D 
expenditure (R&D), capital expenditure (CAPEX), change in working capital (WORKCAP), 
change in cash holdings (∆CASH), and cash dividends (DIV).3 The right hand side shows the 
sources of funds, which includes internally generated cash flows (Cashflow), net equity issuance 
(Equity), and net debt issuance (Debt).  The basic idea in equation (1) is that the uses of funds 
                                                          
3 Our definition of CAPEX includes acquisitions paid with cash and other investments.  This definition is identical 
to the variable INVESTMENTS used in Chang et al. (2014).  We note that acquisitions and other investments 
account for a very small percentage of the variable (about 10 %).  We use this definition to preserve comparability 
with Chang et al. (2014) on which our methodology closely follows.  However, equation (1) differs from Chang et 
al. (2014) in that we consider R&D and working capital as uses of capital whereas in Chang et al. (2014) both of 
these sources are netted out in the Cashflow variable on the right hand side.  Accordingly, we adjust our calculation 
of the Cashflow variable to preserve the identity between the left and right hand sides of equation (1).    
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equal the sources of funds.  Recall that our objective is to see how uses of funds vary with the 
particular choice of external financing: debt and equity. Following GPT, we estimate various 
uses of funds in a given period as follows:  
 ti,1ti,4ti,3ti,2ti,1ti, XCashflowEquityDebtY     . (2) 
In the above equation, Debt, Equity and Cashflow are the sources of funds. Y represents the 
particular use of funds (e.g., R&D, CAPEX, WORKCAP, ∆CASH, and DIV). X represents control 
variables primarily taken from Frank and Goyal (2009) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) and include 
growth opportunities (value to book (VB))4, sales growth, leverage, tangibility and size. All 
variables are indexed on i and t, which represent the firm and time (year), respectively. A detailed 
description and construction of all variables used in the study is provided in the Appendix. The 
contemporaneous relationship between the uses of funds (dependent variable) and the sources of 
funds (independent variables) is consistent with the sources and uses of funds constraint that every 
firm must meet in any given period, but also reflects the firm’s decision to raise funds and use the 
funds raised in the same year.  This latter point could pose a problem in the context of our 
investigation since it is conceivable that funds raised in a given period are not deployed to their 
                                                          
4 Most studies use market to book (MB) as a proxy for growth opportunities.  While MB appears to be a reasonable 
proxy to capture future growth investments, the measure has been criticized because it is also used as a proxy for 
misvaluation. Thus the MB ratio may be confounded by both effects. Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Vishwanathan 
(2005) disentangle the MB ratio into its components, enabling us to isolate the growth opportunities element of the 
ratio. We follow Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) and model the log stock market capitalization of the firm to depend on 
the firm’s log total assets, log leverage, log net income, and net income dummy if income is negative. The fitted 
variable is then divided by total assets to obtain the value-to-book (VB) measure. According to Rhodes-Kropf et al. 
(2005), this measure is a better representation of the firm’s growth opportunities and is not influenced by potential 
firm misvaluation.   
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final use until a subsequent period (e.g., following year), but are parked in a cash account 
temporarily.  Thus, the contemporaneous framework of equation (2) may lead to the incorrect 
inference that a financing source is used to build up liquidity when in fact it is used for an alternate 
purpose such as capital expenditure (e.g., CAPEX), which occurs in a following period.  However, 
this is easily remedied by including lagged values of financing in estimating equation (2). Gatchev 
et al. (2010) recommend estimating equation (2) simultaneously, across the various uses of funds, 
using seemingly unrelated regression estimation procedure with the constraint that the coefficients 
across each use of funds equation for any given source of funds (i.e., debt, equity, cashflow) should 
sum to one. Chang et al. (2014) show that so long as the variables are defined consistently there is 
no need to impose the constraint that the coefficients sum to one and that OLS estimation, in 
contrast to more sophisticated methodologies like seemingly unrelated regressions, produces the 
most reliable estimates so long as we define the variables consistently. Consequently, we adopt 
OLS  in estimating equation (2).5 
The sample consists of U.S. firms in the annual CRSP/Compustat merged dataset and spans 
fiscal years 1971 through 2008. In order to ensure comparability of data over time, all dollar 
denominated variables are converted to 1983 dollars by using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Firm-years are excluded if they have missing data for 
book assets or are financial companies. Missing values for R&D are replaced with zero.6 We 
                                                          
5 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the use of the sources and uses of funds framework and, in 
particular, reference to the work by Chang et al. (2014). 
6 In unreported results, regressions using only non-missing values of R&D were also estimated. The results are similar 
to those reported here. This is not surprising as the literature (see Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999) has already 
established that missing values of R&D generally represents zero R&D expenditures.    
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mitigate the effects of misreported data and extreme outliers in the case of all numeric variables 
by winsorizing either tail at the 0.5% level.  
            Table I presents the summary statistics of the variables used in equation (2). Table II 
presents correlation coefficients between the various uses of funds and the sources of funds  .  As 
a percentage of assets, capital expenditure accounts for the most significant use of funds at 9.53 
percent followed by R&D at 3.7 percent.   The mean change in working capital expenditure is 
negative 4.5 percent while the mean change in cash is a negative 0.1 percent, both scaled by assets.  
On average, debt financing in any given year amounts to 4.65 percent of assets, while external 
equity financing is equal to 3.3 percent of assets. Consistent with Chang et al.’s (2014) observation, 
the sum of the means of R&D, CAPEX, ΔWORKCAP, Δ Cash, and DIV less the means for Debt, 
Equity and Cashflow equal to zero. Thus, the accounting identity can be observed in the data.  
 The pair-wise correlations in Table II reveal that equity (debt) financing is significantly 
positively (negatively) correlated with R&D.  On the other hand, increases in cash are significantly 
positively (negatively) correlated with debt (equity) financing.  Both debt and equity financing are 
positively correlated with increases in working capital investments, while both appear to be 
uncorrelated with capital expenditures.  Overall, the results provide preliminary support for the 
investment risk information asymmetry argument, especially when contrasting the correlations 
between external financing source and their use for R&D and cash buildup.    
(Insert Table I here.) 
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IV.  Results 
Columns 1 through 5 in Tables III and IV provide estimates of equation (2) for each of the uses 
of funds.  Table III presents results using ordinary least squares regressions. In Table IV the 
independent variables are augmented with lagged values for debt and equity financing to account 
for the effects of past financing on current uses of funds. This could be critical since results may 
be confounded by a pure mechanical effect arising from a short-term increase in cash holdings 
whenever capital is issued. Cash holdings one year after issuance are less likely to be subject to 
such an effect. For instance, a firm that issues capital for non-liquidity purposes (e.g., capital 
expenditures) will register an immediate increase in its cash balance, but this balance may not be 
drawn down until later when project development is in full swing. Examining only the 
contemporaneous effect could lead to the incorrect inference that capital was raised for liquidity 
enhancement when in fact it was used to fund capital expenditure.   
A. Debt Usage.  
 Table III shows that coefficients for the debt financing (Debt) variable in   columns (2), (3), 
and (4) are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. These results indicate a positive 
sensitivity of capital expenditures, working capital, and cash, to debt financing. Specifically, the 
results show that a one dollar increase in debt increases capital expenditure by 9.5 cents, working 
capital by 8.8 cents and cash holdings by 76.8 cents.  In the case of R&D (column (1)), the 
magnitude is very small.  R&D accounts for only one cent of every dollar of debt financing.  It is 
interesting to note that the coefficients for debt financing when added across the five use of funds 
equations adds up to one.  We observe this for the equity financing variable as well.  This is 
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consistent with Chang et al.’s (2014) observation that so long as the variables are consistently 
defined there is no need to impose the constraint that coefficients across the various uses should 
sum to one for any given source of financing.    The large increase in cash holdings suggests that 
the firm maybe issuing debt in a particular year and then using the funds in subsequent years.  This 
is evident from Table IV which shows that the increases in working capital and capital expenditure 
are positively related to lagged debt financing.  For example, Table IV shows that 
contemporaneous debt financing accounts for 11 cents of capital expenditure while 4 cents comes 
from lagged debt financing.  This coupled with the much smaller coefficient for lagged debt 
financing  in the cash equation (compared to the coefficient for contemporaneous debt) indicates 
that there may be a lag between financing and where it is eventually used.   Considering both 
Tables III and IV we find that debt financing is associated with a build-up in cash, working capital, 
and investment in capital expenditures.   The insignificant coefficient for debt financing in the 
R&D equation (Tables III and IV) indicates that this source of financing is less likely to be used 
to finance R&D expenditures. The combined evidence from Table III and Table IV supports the 
view that debt financing is used to fund investments with low information asymmetry about their 
risk  such as liquidity enhancement and capital expenditures but not R&D investments, which are 
at the opposite end of the spectrum.     
(Insert Tables III and IV here.) 
B. Equity Usage.  
Table III shows the contemporaneous relationship between equity financing and various uses of 
funds. The regression estimates reveal positive statistically significant coefficients for the equity 
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issuance variable across the various uses of funds.   In terms of economic significance, a one-dollar 
increase in equity financing increases investment in R&D by 21 cents, capital expenditures by 5 
cents, working capital by 3 cents, and cash holdings by 69 cents.  When compared to the coefficient 
for debt financing, there is clear preference by firms to use equity to finance R&D projects. The 
preference for equity financing in funding R&D investments is also evident when lagged values 
of the financing variable are included (Table IV). Though equity financing is positively associated 
with contemporaneous increases in capital expenditures, working capital and cash, the coefficients 
are smaller than those evidenced for debt financing.  The bottom row of Tables III and IV presents 
the difference in the debt and equity financing sensitivity with respect to each of the uses of funds 
and their significance levels.  All of the differences are statistically significant.  Additionally, from 
Table IV we observe that lagged equity financing is not related to current capital expenditure and 
is significantly negatively related to increases in working capital and cash.  
 Overall, the results from Tables III and IV suggest that firms are most likely to use debt 
financing to fund capital expenditures and current liquidity needs.  On the other hand, firms are 
likely to use equity over debt to finance R&D projects.  Our results suggest   that investments with 
the highest risk information asymmetry, i.e., R&D, are financed through equity while investments 
with relatively low information asymmetry about their risk, i.e., capital expenditures and liquidity, 
are financed primarily through debt financing. Thus investments with high (low) information 
asymmetry about risk such as R&D (liquidity and capital expenditures) are financed by more (less) 
information sensitive equity (debt) securities.     
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C.  Robustness Tests for R&D 
In this section we address the issue of whether our results for R&D are due to lack of collateral 
associated with these projects and therefore are financed by equity regardless of the information 
asymmetry of risk.  R&D projects are often characterized by a lack of hard assets (i.e., they are 
intangible assets) to serve as collateral. Hence, it may appear that irrespective of underlying project 
risk information asymmetry the natural choice is to fund R&D through equity financing. Our 
finding that equity (but not debt) financing is associated with R&D investment may reflect the lack 
of collateral rather than any presumed information asymmetry about investment risk inherent in 
R&D projects. To test whether our results reflect information asymmetry or collateral effects, we 
conduct two robustness tests. The first test involves splitting the sample into two halves based on 
the median value of tangible assets (as a proportion of total assets). Our assumption is that R&D 
projects for firms that are less (more) tangible asset intensive have lower (higher) collateral value 
associated with them. Consequently, if we find that debt issuance is not significant in either group, 
then it can be presumed that our full sample results for R&D are due to an information asymmetry 
about the investment risk rather than to the lack of collateral. Our second robustness test involves 
subsample analysis by age of the firm. As firms become older, investors have a larger information 
set about the firm and the nature of its projects. Therefore, in relation to younger firms, older firms 
should have less information asymmetry about the risk of their R&D projects. Consequently, we 
expect equity financing to be more closely associated with R&D expenditures for younger firms 
compared to older firms.  
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  The robustness results using the two tangible asset subgroups are presented in Table V. We 
regress R&D on current period debt and equity financing, cashflow, and other control variables 
(columns (1) and (2)).We also include lagged values of debt and equity sources of funds  in the 
regression model  to account for the effects of past financing on current use of funds in R&D 
investments (columns (3) and (4)).  
            Results reported in Table V show that the R&D investment-debt financing relationship is 
significantly negative for firms with low tangible assets while it is insignificant for firms with high 
tangible assets. On the other hand, the R&D investment-equity financing sensitivities reported in 
columns (1) through (4) are positive and significant indicating that firms, irrespective of tangible 
assets, fund R&D through equity. These results suggest that firms with R&D investments 
inherently face greater risk information asymmetries and higher debt contracting costs, therefore, 
firms are more likely to issue equity to finance their R&D expenditures. 
(Insert Table V here) 
 Table VI presents alternative robustness results for R&D by examining subsamples classified 
by firm age. We present estimates for young firms defined as those with five or fewer years of 
post-IPO existence and older firms defined as those with more than 10 post-IPO years of existence.  
We observe from columns (1) and (2) that the estimated coefficient of R&D for the 
contemporaneous equity financing variable is positive and significant for young and older firms 
alike, but the coefficient for older firms at 0.10 is much smaller than the 0.36 for young firms. The 
results are qualitatively similar when lagged values for financing are included (columns (3) and 
(4)). This is consistent with our prediction that the greater information asymmetry associated with 
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younger firms will yield a stronger sensitivity between equity issuance and the use of funds for 
R&D purposes. In contrast, the R&D-debt financing sensitivities across the four regression models 
are negative and significant, irrespective of the age of firms. These results indicate that both young 
and older firms are less likely to issue debt to finance R&D projects which are associated with 
higher risk of information asymmetries and greater debt contracting costs. 
(Insert Table VI here.) 
V. Conclusions 
We investigate the role of investment-specific information asymmetry in capital structure 
decisions. Recent theoretical work indicates that for projects with less information asymmetry 
about their risk, e.g., increasing liquidity, the preferred choice is to issue debt as it has low 
contracting costs under these conditions. On the other hand, for projects with greater information 
asymmetry about their risk, e.g., R&D, the optimal choice is to issue equity as the returns from the 
project’s risk accrue to the stockholders and contracting costs of debt are very high.  
 Our empirical methodology utilizes the sources and uses of funds framework based on the 
well-established accounting identity that the total funds used by the firm should equal internal cash 
flows in addition to debt and equity raised by the firm. Our primary test methodology involves 
regressing various uses of funds on the sources of funds and other control variables, following 
Chang et al. (2014).  The primary uses of funds we consider are research and development (R&D), 
capital expenditure, working capital changes, changes in cash holdings and cash dividends.  The 
sources of funds include debt and equity financing and internal cash flow, though our focus is on 
the former (external capital sources).  If investment risk information asymmetry is a major driver 
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of financing choice, we should find debt financing to be closely associated  with low risk 
information asymmetry uses (e.g., liquidity enhancement investments) while equity financing 
should be more closely related with projects characterized by high information asymmetry about 
their risk investments such as R&D.  Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that equity, but not 
debt, financing is closely associated with R&D investments which have high information 
asymmetry about their risk.  On the other hand, debt financing is favored in the case of liquidity 
enhancement investments, which have low information asymmetry about their risk and low agency 
costs of debt. These findings are consistent with recent theoretical and empirical findings by Wang 
and Wu (2005), Halov and Heider (2012), Fulghieri and Lukin (2001). 
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Table I 
Descriptive Statistics of  Variables Used in the Study 
The sample consists of 64,64l firm-year observations from the CRSP/Compustat merged dataset with 
fiscal years between 1971-2008. The variables include (1) uses of funds: R&D expenditure (R&D), 
capital expenditures (CAPEX), change in working capital (∆WORKCAP) change in cash holdings 
(∆CASH),  cash dividends (DIV), (2) sources of funds: cash flow (Cashflow), net debt issued (Debt), 
and net equity issued (Equity), and (3) control variables: value to book ratio (VB), a proxy for 
investment opportunities; Sales Growth is the change in net sales scaled by lagged net sales;  Leverage 
(Lev) is defined as total debt (the sum of short-term and long-term debt) divided by total assets; 
Tangibility is the net property, plant and equipment over total assets; and Size is the natural log of sales 
(SALE). All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5% of their distributions. 
 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation  
R&D 0 .0366 0.0000 0.3354  
CAPEX 0.0953 0.0104 0.242  
ΔWORKCAP -0.0447 0.4139 0.4228  
ΔCASH -0.0073 0.0030 0.4823  
DIV 0.0010 0 .0067 0.0277  
Debt 0.0465 0.0000 0.1104  
Equity 0.0335 0.0000 0.3679  
Cashflow 0.0083 0.0808 0.181  
VB 0 .7414 0 .7397 0 .4134  
Sales Growth 0.1929 0.0912 0 .5591  
Leverage (Lev) 0 .1723 0 .0699 0 .2420  
Tangibility (Tang) 0 .2425 0 .1566 0.2373  
Size 3.7281 3.8305 2.4210  
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Table II 
Pair-wise Correlations between Sources and Uses of Funds Variables 
This table presents pair-wise correlations between the uses of funds (columns) and the sources of funds 
(rows). The sample consists of 64,64l firm-year observations from the CRSP/Compustat merged 
dataset with fiscal years between 1971-2008. The uses of funds include R&D expenditure (R&D), 
capital expenditure (CAPEX), change in working capital (∆WORKCAP), change in cash holdings 
(∆Cash),  and cash dividends (DIV).  The sources of funds include internal cash flow (Cashflow), net 
debt issued (Debt), and net equity issued (Equity).  The Bonferroni adjusted significance levels are 
indicated. Coefficients significant at the 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, respectively. 
 
 R&D CAPEX ∆WORKCAP  ΔCASH DIV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Debt -0.03** 0.00 0.04** 0.11** 0.02* 
Equity 0.11** 0.02 0.03* -0.07** 0.04** 
Cashflow -0.23** 0.13** 0.49** 0.29** 0.01 
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Table III 
Use of Funds and Debt and Equity Financing 
This table presents ordinary least squares regression estimates of equation (2) based on the methodology of Chang et 
al. (2014).  The sample consists of 64,64l firm-year observations from the CRSP/Compustat merged dataset with fiscal 
years between 1971-2008. The dependent variable is the use of funds and the independent variables consist of sources 
of financing and other control variables. We consider 5 uses of funds (columns 1-5): R&D expenditure (R&D), capital 
expenditure (CAPEX), change in working capital (WORKCAP), change in cash holdings (∆CASH), and cash 
dividends (DIV).  The sources of funds include net debt issued (Debt), net equity issued (Equity) and cash flow 
(Cashflow).  The control variables include VBt-1, Sales Growth t-1, Leverage t-1, Tang t-1,   and Size t-1.  VBt-1 is a proxy 
for investment opportunities (as estimated in Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005)) and is defined as the lagged value of the 
firm divided by lagged book value of assets. Sales Growth t-1 is the lagged change in net sales scaled by net sales in 
the beginning of the year,  Leverage t-1 is defined as the lagged value of total debt (the sum of short-term and long-
term debt) divided by total assets. Tangibility (Tang t-1) is the lagged value of net property, plant, and equipment over 
total assets. Size t-1 is the lagged value of natural log of sales (SALE). Firm-level fixed effects are generated by 
demeaning the data for each firm for both the dependent and independent variables. Constant terms, and Year dummies 
are not reported.  The last row shows the difference in the coefficient for Debt and Equity financing variables and the 
associated significance level. Standard errors of estimates for the coefficients are presented in parentheses. 
Coefficients significant at the 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, respectively. 
 
 R&D CAPEX ΔWORKCAP ΔCASH DIV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Debtt 0.0086 0.0947 0.0881 0.7678 0.0408 
 (0.0141) (0.0029)** (0.0057)** (0.0066)** (0.0310) 
Equityt 0.2115 0.0478 0.0340 0.6870 0.0196 
 (0.0461)** (0.0026)** (0.0035)** (0.0042)** (0.0006)** 
Cashflowt -0.0430 0.1142 0.6992 0.2279 0.0017 
 (0.0007)** (0.0004)** (0.0004)** (0.0007)** (0.0001)** 
VBt-1 0.0081 0.0042 0.0061 -0.0113 -0.0071 
 (0.0048) (0.0036) (0.0023) (0.0046)* (0.0008)** 
Sales Growth t-1 -0.0030 -0.0230 0.0229 0.0003 0.0027 
 (0.0004)** (0.0005)** (0.0004)** (0.0007) (0.0001)** 
Leverage t-1 -0.0658 0.0038 0.0283 0.0369 -0.0032 
 (0.0019)** (0.0020) (0.0022)** (0.0027)** (0.0005)** 
Tangt-1 0.0928 -0.1192 -0.0625 0.0564 0.0322 
 (0.0079)** (0.0081)** (0.0062)** (0.0073)** (0.0013)** 
Size t-1 -0.0240 -0.0247 0.0066 0.0061 0.0355 
 (0.0009)** (0.0007)** (0.0008)** (0.0010)** (0.0002)** 
R-square 0.18 0.12 0.34 0.28 0.08 
Coefficients of       
Debtt - Equityt -0.2029** 0.0469** 0.0541** 0.0808** 0.0212** 
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Table IV 
Use of Funds from Lagged Debt and Lagged Equity Financing 
 
This table presents ordinary least squares regression estimates of equation (2) based on the methodology of Chang et 
al. (2014).  The sample consists of 64,64l firm-year observations from the CRSP/Compustat merged dataset with fiscal 
years between 1971-2008. The dependent variable is the use of funds and the independent variables consist of sources 
of financing and other control variables. We consider 5 uses of funds (columns 1-5): R&D expenditure (R&D), capital 
expenditure (CAPEX), change in working capital (WORKCAP), change in cash holdings (∆CASH), and cash 
dividends (DIV).  The sources of funds include net debt issued (Debt), net equity issued (Equity), lagged net debt 
issued (Debt t-1), lagged net equity issued (Equity t-1), and cash flow (Cashflow).  The control variables include VBt-1, 
Sales Growth t-1, Leverage t-1, Tang t-1,   and Size t-1.  VBt-1 is a proxy for investment opportunities (as estimated in 
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005)) and is defined as the lagged value of the firm divided by lagged book value of assets. 
Sales Growth t-1 is the lagged change in net sales scaled by net sales in the beginning of the year,  Leverage t-1 is defined 
as the lagged value of total debt (the sum of short-term and long-term debt) divided by total assets. Tangibility (Tang 
t-1) is the lagged value of net property, plant, and equipment over total assets. Size t-1 is the lagged value of natural log 
of sales (SALE). Firm-level fixed effects are generated by demeaning the data for each firm for both the dependent 
and independent variables. Constant terms and Year  dummies are not reported.  The last row shows the difference in 
the coefficient for Debt and Equity financing variables and the associated significance level. Standard errors of 
estimates for the coefficients are presented in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 5%, and 1% levels are 
indicated by *, **, respectively. 
 
 
 R&D CAPEX ΔWORKCAP ΔCASH DIV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Debt t-1 -0.0077 0.0437 0.0251 0.0101 -0.0013 
 (0.0040) (0.0043)** (0.0056)** (0.0103) (0.0011) 
Equity t-1 0.0194 0.0011 -0.0128 -0.0345 -0.0023 
 (0.0033)** (0.0028) (0.0029)** (0.0060)** (0.0018) 
Debtt 0.0078 0.1067 0.0904 0.7923 0.0030 
 (0.0049) (0.0249)** (0.0135)** (0.1070)** (0.0020) 
Equityt 0.2189 0.0467 0.0247 0.6984 0.0114 
 (0.0562)** (0.0140)** (0.0039)** (0.2046)** (0.0026)** 
Cashflow -0.0393 0.0214 0.7878 0.2231 0.0071 
 (0.0107)** (0.0055)** (0.1204)** (0.0529)** (0.0021)** 
VB t-1 0.0119 0.0003 0.0017 -0.0089 -0.0050 
 (0.0032)** (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0051) (0.0009)** 
Sales Growth t-1 -0.0034 -0.0005 0.0035 0.0001 0.0003 
 (0.0011)** (0.0003) (0.0006)** (0.0006) (0.0001)** 
Leverage t-1 -0.0574 0.0069 0.0245 0.0332 -0.0072 
 (0.0128)** (0.0014)** (0.0068)** (0.0087)** (0.0027)** 
Tangt-1 0.0875 -0.1058 -0.0400 0.0568 0.0015 
 (0.0158)** (0.0265)** (0.0070)** (0.0189)** (0.0019) 
Size t-1 -0.0183 -0.0110 0.0104 0.0079 0.0110 
 (0.0029)** (0.0018)** (0.0019)** (0.0018)** (0.0023)** 
R-square 0.19 0.14 0.36 0.27 0.10 
Coefficients of       
Debt t-1 –Equity t-1 -0.027** 0.0426** 0.0379** 0.0446** 0.0010 
Debtt - Equityt -0.2111** 0.0600** 0.0658** 0.0939** -0.0084** 
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Table V 
Robustness Test for R&D Using Asset Tangibility 
This table presents regression estimates of equation (2) for R&D expenditures classified by proportion of tangible 
assets to total assets. The test involves splitting the sample into two halves (low tangible assets and high tangible assets 
based on the median value of tangible assets (as a proportion of total assets). Number of observations is 32,320 
(32,321) for the low (high) tangible subset. The dependent variable is R&D expenditure. The independent variables 
consist of sources of funds variables and other control variables.  The sources of funds include net debt issued (Debt), 
net equity issued (Equity), lagged net debt issued (Debt t-1), lagged net equity issued (Equity t-1), and cash flow 
(Cashflow).  The control variables include VBt-1, Sales Growth t-1, Leverage t-1, Tang t-1,   and Size t-1.  VBt-1 is a proxy 
for investment opportunities (as estimated in Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005)) and is defined as the lagged value of the 
firm divided by lagged book value of assets. Sales Growth t-1 is the lagged change in net sales scaled by net sales in 
the beginning of the year,  Leverage t-1 is defined as the lagged value of total debt (the sum of short-term and long-
term debt) divided by total assets. Tangibility (Tang t-1) is the lagged value of net property, plant, and equipment over 
total assets. Size t-1 is the lagged value of natural log of sales (SALE). Firm-level fixed effects are generated by 
demeaning the data for each firm for both the dependent and independent variables. Constant terms and Year, dummies 
are not reported.  Standard errors of estimates for the coefficients are presented in parentheses. Coefficients significant 
at the 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, respectively. 
 
R&D Low Tangible Assets High Tangible Assets Low Tangible Assets High Tangible Assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Debt t-1   -0.0052 -0.0050 
   (0.0067) (0.0235) 
Equity t-1   0.0404 0.0202 
   (0.0070)** (0.0052)** 
Debtt -0.0784 0.0522 -0.0667 0.0757 
 (0.0084)** (0.0389) (0.0099)** (0.0642) 
Equityt 0.2806 0.1924 0.2968 0.1853 
 (0.0960)** (0.0789)* (0.1060)** (0.0694)** 
Cashflow -0.0497 -0.0703 -0.0493 -0.0560 
 (0.0057)** (0.0054)** (0.0068)** (0.0053)** 
VB t-1 0.0338 0.0109 0.0256 0.0353 
 (0.0061)** (0.0068) (0.0057)** (0.0063)** 
Sales Growth t-1 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0005 
 (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0012) 
Leverage t-1 -0.0018 -0.0008 -0.0033 -0.0023 
 (0.0003)** (0.0003)** (0.0001)** (0.0003)** 
Tangt-1 0.0373 0.0450 0.0445 0.0626 
 (0.0134)** (0.0200)* (0.0208)* (0.0131)** 
Size t-1 -0.0161 -0.0210 -0.0150 -0.0085 
 (0.0031)** (0.0034)** (0.0030)** (0.0022)** 
R-square 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.18 
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Table VI 
Robustness Test Using Firm Age Subsamples 
This table presents regression estimates of equation (2) for R&D expenditures classified by firm age: Young firms (=< 
5 years post IPO) and  Older firms (> 10 years post IPO). Number of observations is 34,519 (9,558) for young (older) firms. The 
independent variables consist of sources of funds variables and other control variables.  The sources of funds include 
net debt issued (Debt), net equity issued (Equity), lagged net debt issued (Debt t-1), lagged net equity issued (Equity t-
1), and cash flow (Cashflow).  The control variables include VBt-1, Sales Growth t-1, Leverage t-1, Tang t-1,   and Size t-
1.  VBt-1 is a proxy for investment opportunities (as estimated in Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005)) and is defined as the 
lagged value of the firm divided by lagged book value of assets. Sales Growth t-1 is the lagged change in net sales 
scaled by net sales in the beginning of the year,  Leverage t-1 is defined as the lagged value of total debt (the sum of 
short-term and long-term debt) divided by total assets. Tangibility (Tang t-1) is the lagged value of net property, plant, 
and equipment over total assets. Size t-1 is the lagged value of natural log of sales (SALE). Firm-level fixed effects are 
generated by demeaning the data for each firm for both the dependent and independent variables. Constant terms, and 
Year dummies are not reported.  Standard errors of estimates for the coefficients are presented in parentheses. 
Coefficients significant at the 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, respectively.  
 
R&D Young Older Young Older 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Debt t-1   -0.0053 -0.0186 
   (0.0074) (0.0149) 
Equity t-1   0.0274 0.0134 
   (0.0065)** (0.0060)* 
Debtt -0.0715 -0.0447 -0.0594 -0.0484 
 (0.0055)** (0.0186)* (0.0067)** (0.0239)* 
Equityt 0.3584 0.0995 0.3622 0.1108 
 (0.0975)** (0.0179)** (0.0965)** (0.0181)** 
Cashflow -0.0500 -0.0860 -0.0566 -0.0821 
 (0.0009)** (0.0021)** (0.0003)** (0.0026)** 
VB t-1 -0.0005 0.0076 0.0001 0.0065 
 (0.0049) (0.0078) (0.0047) (0.0080) 
Sales Growth t-1 -0.0009 -0.0022 -0.0005 -0.0004 
 (0.0005) (0.0027) (0.0005) (0.0014) 
Leverage t-1 0.0030 -0.0025 0.0005 -0.0073 
 (0.0046) (0.0087) (0.0016) (0.0098) 
Tangt-1 0.0524 0.0075 0.0394 0.0094 
 (0.0062)** (0.0061) (0.0132)** (0.0249) 
Size t-1 -0.0109 -0.0142 -0.0261 -0.0331 
 (0.0019)** (0.0042)** (0.0030)** (0.0032)** 
R-squared 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.24 
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 Appendix. Variable Construction 
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Variable Name Description and Source (Note: Compustat variable names in parentheses) 
Panel A: Use of Funds Variables 
ΔCASH Change in Cash between post-issuance year and pre-issuance year. Cash is defined as cash and 
short-term investments (CHE) divided by AT. Source: Compustat 
CAPEX 
 
 
 
 
 
DIV 
This variable is defined and estimated the same way as Investments in Chang et al. (2104): 
(Before 1988): Capital expenditure (CAPX) plus increase in investment (IVCH) plus 
acquisitions (AQC) less sale of property plant and equipment (SPPE) less sale of investment 
(SIV) plus other use of funds (FUSEO). Source: Compustat 
(After 1988): Capital expenditure (CAPX) plus increase in investment (IVCH) plus acquisitions 
(AQC) less sale of property plant and equipment (SPPE) less sale of investment (SIV) less 
change in short term investment (IVSTCH) less other investing activities (IVACO) . Source: 
Compustat 
Cash dividends (dv) divided AT. Source: Compustat 
R&D R&D expenditures (XRD) divided by AT. As is customary (Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 
(1999)), missing R&D is set equal to zero. Source: Compustat 
 
ΔWORKCAP (Before 1988): Change in working capital (WCAPC) divided AT. Source: Compustat 
(After 1988): Is the negative of the sum of the following items. Change in accounts recievable 
(RECCH) , change in inventory (INVCH), change in accounts payable (APALCH), accrued 
income taxes (TXACH), changes in assets and liabilities (AOLOCH), other financing activities 
(FIAO). Source: Compustat 
  
Panel B: Sources of Funds Variables  
Cashflow Is the sum of income before extra items (IBC) + extra items and discontinued operations 
(XIDOC) + depreciation and amortization (DPC) + deferred taxes (TXDC) + equity in net loss 
(ESUBC) + gains in sale of PPE & investment (SPPIV) + other funds from operation (FOPO) + 
other sources of funds (FRSCO) + R&D expenditure (XRD) divided by AT. Source: Compustat 
Debt 
 
 
 
Is long-term debt issuance (DLTIS) less long-term debt reduction (DLTR) less changes in 
current debt (DLCCH) divided by the beginning of the year book assets (AT). Source: 
Compustat 
 
Equity Sale of stock less purchase of stock (SSTK – PRSTKC) divided by the beginning of the year 
AT. Source: Compustat 
  
  
  
Panel C: Other Control Variables 
Leverage Total long-term debt (DLTT) and short-term debt (DLC) divided by AT. Source: Compustat 
Sales Growth Year over year percentage change in sales. Source: Compustat 
Size Log of sales (SALE). Source: Compustat 
Tang (Tangibility) Net property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) divided by AT. Source: Compustat 
VB (Value to Book) Value of the firm is estimated as in Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005). Market value is a function of 
AT, net income (NI), and leverage. The fitted market value is then divided by AT to generate 
the VB ratio. Source: Compustat 
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